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Abstract  
There is a belief that the use of the atomic bombs caused the end of the Pacific 
War and thus saved many lives. However, historical accounts indicate that the war 
could have ended less destructively. A greater number of Japanese civilians died 
from the atomic bombs than the expected casualties of American soldiers – casting 
doubt on justification for Hiroshima and Nagasaki. However, Taurek’s ‘Should 
the Numbers Count?’ reveals that numbers may not necessarily play a role in 
making a moral decision. This paper examines Taurek’s ethical arguments in 
relation to the historical events and concludes that, while Taurek’s argument may 
appear plausible, his philosophical ideas do not adequately justify the use of the 
atomic bombs. 
This article has been peer reviewed 
In August 1945, two atomic bombs were released over Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki. The catastrophic damage led to the destruction of whole 
cities. Records of local Hiroshima and Nagasaki governments show 
that more than 210,000 victims were killed within the first months.1 
                                                 
1 For Hiroshima, see ‘1945 nen 8 gatsu 6 ka: Haikyo no Hiroshima,’ Hiroshima 
Heiwa Kinen Shiryokan (Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum), accessed 8 April 
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Heartbreaking stories have been recorded,2 for example, as illustrated 
by the testimony of a sixteen-year-old boy, Akira Onogi:  
We found this small girl crying and she asked us to help her mother. Just 
beside the girl, her mother was trapped by a fallen beam…we had no 
choice but to leave her. She was conscious and we deeply bowed to her 
with clasped hands to apologise to her and then we left.3 
This story, sadly, is only the tip of the iceberg. Those who survived 
suffered from radioactive fallout, and there have been impacts on 
future generations because of genetic damage. The ‘Hibakusha’, (the 
label commonly given to atomic bomb survivors) have often 
experienced social discrimination including inability to gain 
employment. In addition there has been damage to the environment. 
Shortly after the nuclear attack, newspaper editorials all over the 
world (including those in the United States and the United Kingdom) 
expressed concerns about the catastrophic weapon.4 The tragedy has 
influenced our feelings regarding the inhumanity of the destructive 
weapon. However, the United States (US) President Harry S. Truman 
justified his decision to drop the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki, by arguing that they ended the Pacific War and saved many 
lives including those of American soldiers.5 Even in the twenty-first 
century, the crew who were responsible for atomic bombing of 
                                                                                 
2013, http://www.pcf.city.hiroshima.jp/outline/index.php?l=J&id=18. For 
Nagasaki, see ‘Genbaku no Iryoku: Genbaku Saigai Hokoku,’ Nagasaki City, 
accessed 8 April 2013, 
http://www1.city.nagasaki.nagasaki.jp/peace/japanese/record/iryoku.html.  
2 See Kyoko Selden and Mark Selden, eds., The Atomic Bomb: Voices from Hiroshima 
and Nagasaki (Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, 1989); James V. Neel and William J. Schull, 
eds., The Children of Atomic Bomb Survivors: A Genetic Study (Washington DC: 
National Academy Press, 1991). 
3 ‘Testimony of Akira Onogi,’ Voice of Hibakusha, accessed 8 April 2013, 
http://www.inicom.com/hibakusha/akira.html. 
4 G. V. Portus, ‘The Atom Bomb and the World,’ in The Atomic Age. Kerr Grant 
and G. V. Portus (Adelaide: United Nations Association, South Australian 
Division, 1946). 
5 Harry S. Truman, Memoirs: Volume 1 Year of Decisions (New York: The New 
American Library, 1965). 
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Hiroshima publically admitted that they ‘have no regrets.’6 Ideas such 
as utilitarianism and political expediency have been used to justify this 
decision.  
This paper will examine the historical background of the atomic 
bombing and discuss its moral justification. Jonathan Dancy argues 
that ‘to have the relevant sensitivities just is to be able to get things 
right case by case.’7 Applied ethics which has become an active 
philosophical activity since Peter Singer became noted four decades 
ago,8 is used to theorise this paper. Due to the massive destruction 
caused by nuclear weapons, not just to the current generation but 
future generations and the environment, the justification of atomic 
bombing is one of the biggest challenges to morality. Although the 
justification of Hiroshima and Nagasaki has been discussed by 
researchers including but not limited to Gar Alperovitz,9 Barton F. 
Bernstein10 and Tsuyoshi Hasegawa11, historical accounts, instead of 
moral philosophy, have stayed at the centre of these discussions. 
Almost seventy years has passed since the tragedy, yet historians are 
unable to reach a consensus.12 Because it is unlikely that any new 
documents will be discovered,13 it is time to find an alternative 
method to analyse the justification of the atomic bombings. This 
paper challenges the existing debate on what historical events made 
                                                 
6 ‘Enola Gay crew “have no regrets”’, BBC, 4 August 2005, accessed 12 February 
2014, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/4743061.stm.  
7 Jonathan Dancy, Moral Reasons (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1993), 64.  
8 See: James Rachels and Stuart Rachels, eds., The Right Thing to Do, 4th ed, 
(Boston: McGraw Hill, 2007), 138.  
9 Gar Alperovitz, Atomic Diplomacy: Hiroshima and Potsdam (NY: Simon and 
Schuster, 1965). 
10 Barton F. Bernstein, ‘The Atomic Bombings Reconsidered’ Foreign Affairs, 74:1 
(1995), 135-152.  
11 Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, Racing the Enemy: Stalin, Truman, and the Surrender of Japan 
(Cambridge: The Belnap Press of Harvard University Press, 2005). 
12 For example, see: ‘H-Diplo Roundtable- Racing the Enemy Roundtable’ H-
Diplo Roundtables, 7:2 (2006), accessed 12 February 2014, http://www.h-
net.org/~diplo/roundtables/archived-roundtables.html.  
13 Gar Alperovitz, ‘H-Diplo Roundtable- Racing the Enemy Roundtable, 
Alperovitz on Hasegawa’ H-Diplo Roundtables, 7:2 (2006), 9, accessed 12 February 
2014, http://www.h-net.org/~diplo/roundtables/PDF/Alperovitz-
HasegawaRoundtable.pdf.  
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Japanese surrender. History, things which happened in the past, are 
taken as factual events only. This paper acknowledges that three 
historical factors, the unconditional surrender requested of Japan, the 
entry of the Soviet Union (the USSR) into the war, and the nuclear 
attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, each affected the Japanese 
decision to announce the end of the war on 15 August 1945, not 
earlier or later. Furthermore, this paper also acknowledges that there 
was a race between the US and the USSR to gain the upper hand in 
the post-war situation. International politics is like a game of chess, 
although not the two dimensional game that is known to us but that 
of multi-dimensions, thus it would have been illogical if the leaders 
were not considering the post war situation. Aside from 
historiography, John M. Taurek’s use of applied ethics theory in his 
article ‘Should the Numbers Count?’14 seems best suited to morally 
justify the use of the atomic bombs. He argues that we are morally 
permitted to save ourselves even though the casualty of others is larger.  
What could be the justification for dropping atomic bombs? 
In order to state moral justifications in general, well-recognised 
ethicists such as James Rachels15 and Adam Morton16 use dot points. 
This form provides a step-by-step explanation that can be easily 
understood. This paper combines this style of moral philosophy and 
Truman’s thoughts, which could be best postulated after reading his 
book,17 to justify dropping the atomic bombs. This is how the 
argument follows.  
1) It is morally right for American soldiers not to be killed 
unnecessarily, as they are innocent people.  
                                                 
14 John M. Taurek, ‘Should the Numbers Count?’ Philosophy & Public Affairs, 6:4 
(1977), 293-316. 
15 James Rachels, The Elements of Moral Philosophy, 3rd ed. (New York: McGraw-
Hill, 1999).  
16 Adam Morton, Philosophy in Practice: An Introduction to the Main Questions, 2nd ed. 
(Malden: Blackwell, 2003).  
17 Truman, Memoirs.  
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2) Invasion of the main islands of Japan will cause the 
death of 25,000 – 46,000 American soldiers.18  
3) Thus, it is morally acceptable to act somehow in order to 
avoid the invasion, hence the subsequent deaths.  
4) Consequently, the American leaders had asked Japan to 
surrender unconditionally.  
5) However, as Japan did not accept this, it was right to try 
ending the war some other way and avoid the need for 
invasion.  
6) Atomic bombing of Japan would likely end the war. 
7) Thus, it was morally right to drop the atomic bombs on 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki to end the war.  
Although this argument seems to flow, there are three objections 
that make it difficult to employ. First, conditional surrender could have 
been proposed to Japan instead unconditional surrender. Second, the 
use of atomic bombs on both Hiroshima and Nagasaki could have 
been avoided. Last, the disproportionate number of Japanese deaths 
and other destruction from the atomic bombs does not seem morally 
defensible.  
Why unconditional surrender? 
As the ‘kill ratio’ between the US and Japanese was one to twenty 
four towards the end of the war (between March 1944 and April 
                                                 
18 Bernstein, ‘The Atomic Bombings Reconsidered,’ 149. Also note that The US 
government revealed after the war that ‘prior to 31 December 1945, and in all 
probability prior to 1 November 1945 (when the invasion was planned), Japan 
would have surrendered even if the atomic bombs had not been dropped, even if 
Russia had not entered the war, and even if no invasion had been planned or 
contemplated.’ – but the invasion was an active plan at the late stage of the war. 
See: ‘United States Strategic Bombing Survey Report: Summary Report (Pacific 
War)’, Washington D.C., 1 July 1946, 26, accessed 4 February 2014, 
http://www.anesi.com/ussbs01.htm. 
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1945),19 it was no longer a matter of who would win the war, but 
when. Japan’s unconditional surrender was first requested on 26 July 
1945 in the Potsdam Proclamation, after the meeting of three political 
leaders; the US President Truman, the British Prime Minister Winston 
Churchill, and USSR leader Joseph Stalin.20 Although conditional 
surrender could have been requested, it might have been seen as too 
lenient by the US citizens. Unconditional language was politically 
important for Truman to build his political security, as he was only a 
newly appointed (not elected) president after the sudden death of his 
predecessor, Franklin D. Roosevelt.21 On the other hand, for the 
Japanese leaders, the language of unconditional surrender would have 
been a difficult political pill to swallow.  
Additionally for the US, it was important that the $2 billion atomic 
bomb project not be seen as a waste but significant – politically the 
revolutionary weapon needed to be used to end the war. The use of 
the atomic bombs in nowhere remote location, such as a deserted 
island, to scare the enemy off was not considered adequate. 
Therefore, the weapon ‘had to be used against an enemy target.’22 By 
late April 1945, the atomic bomb target was focussed on four cities, 
based on the idea of ‘large urban areas of not less than three miles in 
diameter existing in the larger populated areas.’23  
Meanwhile in Japan, by early May, the Emperor (the official head 
of the Japanese Empire who approved the decisions of his advisors), 
was becoming flexible regarding possible surrender.24 The Emperor 
had a meeting with Japanese cabinet officials on 22 June and 
personally opened the proceedings by declaring that it was necessary 
                                                 
19 Selden and Selden, The Atomic Bomb. 
20 Neel and Schull, The Children of Atomic Bomb Survivors, 454.  
21 Gar Alperovitz, ‘Hiroshima: Historians Reassess,’ Foreign Policy, no. 99 (1995), 
26.  
22 Truman, Memoirs, 462.  
23 Bernstein, ‘The Atomic Bombings Reconsidered,’ 140. 
24 ‘United States Strategic Bombing Survey Report: Summary Report (Pacific 
War)’, 25-26. 
Applying Taurek (un)justify Hiroshima and Nagasaki: – Tets Kimura 
26 
to consider the end of the war by negotiation.25 It is plausible that if 
the Potsdam Proclamation was ‘softer’, Japan could have surrendered 
before the atomic bombing. The US Acting Secretary of State Joseph 
C. Grew even asked Truman to consider being flexible but sections 
embodying such flexibility were deleted from the final draft of the 
Proclamation.26 The proposal of unconditional surrender possibly 
played a role in delaying Japan’s decision to surrender, whereas an 
offer of a conditional surrender may have produced a more timely 
decision. In fact, the future entry of USSR into the war, made it even 
more likely that Japan would have surrendered without the use of 
atomic bombs.27  
Why Hiroshima and Nagasaki 
The war entered its very final stage in August 1945. Hiroshima was 
destroyed on 6 August. The Emperor most likely learnt about the 
nuclear attack on the next day, and became ‘increasingly articulate and 
urgent in expressing his wish for peace.’28 On 9 August, there were 
additional ‘twin shocks’29: Nagasaki became the second nuclear victim 
and the USSR broke the Russo-Japanese Neutrality Pact and declared 
war on Japan, as agreed with the US in Potsdam,30 Churchill said, 
‘when Russia came into the war against Japan, the Japanese would 
probably wish to get out on almost any terms short of the 
dethronement of the Emperor.’31 It was now plausible that Japan 
would have surrendered anyway. However in the US, there was ‘no 
indication that the decision to drop the second bomb was ever 
                                                 
25 Robert A. Pape, ‘Why Japan Surrendered’ International Security, 18:2 (1993), 184, 
185.  
26 Sadao Asada, ‘The Shock of the Atomic Bomb and Japan’s Decision to 
Surrender – A Reconsideration’ Pacific Historical Review, 67:4 (1998), 500. 
27 See: Hasegawa, Racing the Enemy.  
28 Asada, ‘The Shock of the Atomic Bomb and Japan’s Decision to Surrender,’ 
487.  
29 Asada, ‘The Shock of the Atomic Bomb and Japan’s Decision to Surrender,’ 
490. 
30 Pape, ‘Why Japan Surrendered,’ 177. Note also that although USSR’s entry to 
the war took place earlier than originally planned and that was between 20 and 25 
August see Hasegawa, Racing the Enemy, 178. 
31 Alperovitz, ‘Hiroshima,’ 21.  
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reconsidered… and no one thought it necessary to change the course 
because of the Soviet entry into the war.’32 Truman learnt about the 
USSR’s action before the B29 that was to bomb Nagasaki had left an 
airbase,33 and it was still technically able to jettison the atomic bomb 
to abort the mission after the take-off.34 However, no action was 
taken to avoid the second nuclear attack.  
Meanwhile in Tokyo, discussion to accept possible unconditional 
surrender started in the late morning of 9 August – the news of 
Nagasaki nuclear attack was delivered during the meeting but had 
little impact on the decision making.35 Around 2am on 10 August, 
Japanese leaders finally had concluded that it would be more than 
likely that they would accept the Potsdam Proclamation. However, 
even though the atomic bombs and the USSR’s entry into the war had 
clearly caused Japan to surrender, they did not discuss directly 
whether either event caused the surrender.36 Japan’s unconditional 
surrender was decided officially on 14 August, and made public on 
the following day.  
American political leaders were concerned that if the USSR’s entry 
clearly caused an end to the war, the USSR would have insisted on 
their right to occupy a part of Japan (just like eastern Germany was 
claimed since the USSR’s contribution to win against Germany was 
undeniable).37 Therefore, it has been said that the atomic bombs 
saved Japan’s future from communists. The USSR continued 
attacking Japanese territories even after the announcement of the end 
of the war. For example, on 18 August, the USSR forces began 
landing at Shimushu, the northern end of archipelago of Kuril 
Islands, kilometres away from the Kamchatka Peninsula. The invasion 
went on and by early September, the USSR occupied all the Kuril 
                                                 
32 Hasegawa, Racing the Enemy, 194.  
33 Hasegawa, Racing the Enemy, 194.  
34 Robert S. Norris, Racing for the Bomb: General Leslie R. Groves, the Manhattan 
Project's Indispensable Man (South Royalton: Steerforth, 2002), 421-424.  
35 Hasegawa, Racing the Enemy, 204.  
36 Bernstein, ‘The Atomic Bombings Reconsidered,’ 133-134.  
37 James R. Van de Velde, ‘Opinion: The Enola Gay Saved Lives’ Political Science 
Quarterly, 110:3 (1995), 457.  
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Island,38 but did not land on Hokkaido which is only kilometres away 
from the southern end of Kuril Islands. If this operation had 
escalated, there was a possibility that part or whole Hokkaido might 
have fallen under communism). By using the atomic bombs, the US 
could claim that the cause to end the war was atomic bombing, rather 
than the USSR’s entry into the war. Japan was politically controlled by 
the Allies, led by the US until 1952.  
However, even if these claims regarding communism were true, 
the use of two atomic bombs was still morally questionable. It may be 
that the impact of Hiroshima would have been strong enough for the 
Japanese leaders to consider unconditional surrender. The atomic 
bomb was a revolutionary weapon. After the first atomic bomb, 
‘some [Japanese] civilian leaders were immediately convinced that 
Japan could not sustain this new form of warfare.’39 Similarly, the use 
of one or two atomic bombs would have made no difference to the 
USSR, because at that time, they did not have the technology to build 
a nuclear weapon. Thus, it is likely that the use of two atomic bombs 
was unnecessary, as one atomic bomb would have made a huge 
impact on both Japan and the USSR.  
Unequal numbers/one-sided utilitarianism 
The third objection is related to a form of utilitarian account: 
utilitarianism stands for the greatest amount of happiness for the 
greatest amount of people. In earlier 1945, it can be argued that the 
greatest good was achieved by ending the war. As has been 
mentioned in this paper, the war could have ended in ways other than 
it did. Even if it did not, the justification to drop the atomic bombs 
on Hiroshima and Nagasaki is morally explained by ‘one-sided 
utilitarianism’, not even full utilitarianism. The justification of killing 
the Japanese people to save the American lives can only be accepted 
by the Americans and for the Americans, thus ignoring the moral 
rights of the Japanese people.  
                                                 
38 Hasegawa, Racing the Enemy, 289.  
39 Pape, ‘Why Japan Surrendered,’ 176. 
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Furthermore, the number of Japanese casualties was far larger than 
the expected casualties of the American soldiers. For example, the 
American casualties from the invasion of the Japanese main islands 
were expected to be between 25,000 and 46,000. On the other hand, 
no fewer than 210,000 victims died as a result of the atomic bombs. 
Additionally, many more thousands of survivors as well as their future 
generations suffered from the impact of radioactivity.  
However, unlike the moral failings identified in historical events 
(the proposal of unconditional surrender and the use of two atomic 
bombs), the unequal numbers might be justified by adopting Taurek’s 
argument ‘Should the Numbers Count?’.40  
You are entitled to save one/s you like 
Taurek’s view is best explained in the David example. In this 
example, David, who is ‘someone I know and like’41 is in danger of 
losing his arm, and a stranger experiences a near death situation (such 
as terminal cancer). According to Taurek, it is typically believed that 
you should save the stranger’s life rather than David’s arm if there is 
only one medication that can save either David’s arm or the stranger’s 
life.42 However, Taurek argues that this is not always the case.  
Taurek argues that if the choice were up to David, he would 
morally be permitted to save his arm rather than the stranger’s life as 
this is in his own interest. It is natural for an individual to take care of 
their own interest rather than someone else’s. Consequently, Taurek 
says, ‘unless it is for some reason morally impermissible for one 
person to take the same interest in another’s welfare as he himself 
takes in it, it must be permissible for me, in the absence of special 
obligations to the contrary, to choose the outcome that is in [David’s] 
best interest.’43 You would be morally permitted to take care of 
David’s welfare, unless it is your duty to take care of the stranger, as 
much as David himself permissibly takes care of himself, especially if 
                                                 
40 Taurek, ‘Should the Numbers Count?.’ 
41 Taurek, ‘Should the Numbers Count?,’ 295. 
42 Derek Parfit, ‘Innumerate Ethics’ Philosophy & Public Affairs, 7:4 (1978), 285. 
43 Taurek, ‘Should the Numbers Count?,’ 302. 
Applying Taurek (un)justify Hiroshima and Nagasaki: – Tets Kimura 
30 
David is someone you deeply care about.44 Taurek also says the 
number of strangers does not have to be singular but can also be 
plural.  
Why don’t numbers matter?  
Suppose that you had a supply of a medicine, and six people would 
certainly die if they were not given the medicine. Suppose also that 
one of the six, namely David, needs all of the medicine for his 
survival and another five need only one-fifth each. Taurek says that 
most people think to save the greater number.45  
However, Taurek’s belief is different. He says if David is ‘someone 
I know and like’, and the other five are strangers, you might decide to 
give all of your medicine to David.46 Taurek says that the idea was 
that this consideration would make a difference in the decision 
making process, because in the view ‘the death of the one person 
would in fact be a worse thing to have happen than would be the 
deaths of these five.’47 In other words, Taurek says that you are 
allowed to choose the one you prefer to save regardless of numbers, 
and you are morally allowed to behave accordingly. You can still save 
David even if he only suffers from losing his arm, and the other five 
suffer from the loss of their lives. This decision-making is influenced 
by the moral force of the decision maker, because ‘I cannot imagine 
that I could give David any reason why he should think it better that 
these five strangers should continue to live than that he should.’48 
In the atomic bomb scenario, Truman could say the following. ‘I, 
as the President, cannot imagine that I could give American soldiers 
any reason why they should think it better that people in Hiroshima 
and Nagasaki should continue to live than they should.’ Therefore, 
Truman has the ‘moral force’ to take care of the smaller number of 
American soldiers rather than the larger number of Japanese civilians. 
This can be summarised as follows.  
                                                 
44 Parfit, ‘Innumerate Ethics,’ 286, 287. 
45 Taurek, ‘Should the Numbers Count?,’ 294. 
46 Taurek, ‘Should the Numbers Count?,’ 295. 
47 Taurek, ‘Should the Numbers Count?,’ 296. 
48 Taurek, ‘Should the Numbers Count?,’ 300. 
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1) American soldiers would not be morally deficient if they 
preferred that Truman saves them rather than thousands of Japanese 
civilians. 
2) Therefore, the death of the Japanese cannot be a worse 
outcome than the death of American soldiers.  
However, this is not yet a full counter argument to justify saving a 
smaller number of American soldiers than a larger number of 
Japanese civilians. In general, people tend to believe that it is moral to 
save larger numbers of people, since people ‘work out which action 
will produce the most happiness compared with unhappiness or 
pain.’49 
In the case of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the negative consequences 
were significantly large due to the effects of current and future 
generations in addition to environmental damages. Therefore, from a 
utilitarian point, the use of the atomic bombs cannot be morally 
justified as it was not the best way to maximise utility. Therefore, the 
following statements can be said: 
1) The morally right thing to do, on any occasion, is 
whatever would bring about the greatest balance of happiness over 
unhappiness.50 
2) Since the use of the atomic bombs violated this utility 
balance, it is not morally justified.  
This argument is plausible. However, this utilitarian argument is 
rejected by C. S. Lewis, who argues suffering is not additive or 
cumulative.  
We must never make the problem of pain worse than it is by vague talk 
about ‘the unimaginable sum of human misery.’ Suppose that I have a 
toothache of intensity X: and suppose that you, who are seated beside 
me, also begin to have a toothache of intensity X. You may, if you 
                                                 
49 Noel Stewart, Ethics: An Introduction to Moral Philosophy (Cambridge: Polity Press, 
2009), 13.  
50 Rachels, The Elements of Moral Philosophy, 100.  
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choose, say that the total amount of pain in the room is now 2X. But 
you must remember that no one is suffering 2X: search all time and all 
space and you will not find that composite pain in anyone’s 
consciousness. There is no such thing as a sum of suffering, for no one 
suffers it.51  
Thus, by employing Lewis’ idea, Taurek’s argument could be used 
to justify that the unequal number of deaths does not matter. Taurek 
himself tends to agree with Lewis’ view. In the David example, he 
says that for each of the six people, there is no doubt that death is a 
terrible thing. Each member faces the loss of something among the 
things he/she values most – thus it is better if s/he can avoid death.52 
However, Taurek also says ‘Five individuals each losing his life does 
not add up to anyone’s experiencing a loss five times greater than the 
loss suffered by any one of the five [individuals].’53 Just like Lewis, 
Taurek believes suffering is not additive, therefore it is rather 
important to consider whom you are saving from suffering. The 
numbers, in themselves, simply do not count, but rather who they are 
and what kind of relationship you have, count.  
Special obligation: To whom should the priority be given?  
Taurek approves of giving priority or ‘special obligation’ to 
‘someone I know and like,’ but there is no clear explanation of ‘how 
far’ this concept can be stretched. It is difficult to imagine that 
‘someone I know and like’ can be beyond someone you personally 
know. They are probably your family members or friends. In some 
exceptions, this person might be a celebrity (thus you do not know 
them personally), but at least you know of them. Without knowing or 
knowing of them, it is impossible to like them. Of course, it is still 
possible to decide to like some stranger by looking at, say, their 
Facebook profile photo. You now like them because they appear 
attractive. However, this does not mean you know them. Instead you 
merely like their appearance after viewing their photo.  
                                                 
51 C. S. Lewis, The Problem of Pain (London: The Centenary Press, 1940), 103-104.  
52 Taurek, ‘Should the Numbers Count?,’ 307. 
53 Taurek, ‘Should the Numbers Count?,’ 307. 
FJHP – Volume 29 – 2013 
33 
The atomic bomb decision was not a personal but a political 
decision. It is clear that Truman did not know and like all American 
soldiers whom he prioritised, even if he was able to read all soldiers’ 
names in a file, (or Facebook profiles if they existed in 1945). At best, 
with the exception of his own family and friends who happened to be 
in the military, Truman would only know names and other available 
personal details such as date and place of birth, not personality. It is 
implausible that Truman knew all the soldiers, and it is even harder to 
prove that he liked all the soldiers. Considering everyday life, it is 
obvious that you do not like every citizen of your own country. 
Taurek’s idea of ‘someone I know and like’ does not fit in this 
historical case.  
Taurek also argues that your moral decision can also be affected by 
your occupational duty. For example, Taurek states that a Coast 
Guard Captain is ‘duty-bound’54 to act in a certain way when 
considering whom he should save. In this example, the Captain has to 
make a decision to save a larger number of people on the northern 
coast, or a smaller number of people on the southern coast. It is the 
captain’s moral obligation to go to the north, and surely the captain is 
not permitted to go to the south even if his friends are in the south.55  
Consequently, as a politician, it was Truman’s duty and 
responsibility to take care of his citizens, including soldiers. Truman’s 
duty as the President is to act in his best interests of the country and 
his citizens. Therefore, it can be said that his strongest interest was to 
end the war the best possible way for the US, including consideration 
of the post-war international politics. So it was perhaps politically 
justified (although not morally justified) to use atomic bombs (or just 
one atomic bomb) to end the war.  
Not everyone would be convinced by this argument. Taurek 
argues that your concern for another person comes from your 
appreciation of what your situation means to you. For example, 
Truman had a political right to choose whether to save the certain 
                                                 
54 Taurek, ‘Should the Numbers Count?,’ 311. 
55 Taurek, ‘Should the Numbers Count?,’ 310-311. 
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death of American soldiers from invading Japan’s main islands.56 It is 
highly unlikely American soldiers thought they should not have 
Truman’s moral force to save them. Therefore, atomic bombing 
could be justified.  
The problem with this view, as in the David example, is that no 
one has a right to cause harm actively in order to save David. This 
means that Truman did not have the right to increase the suffering of 
the Japanese (by killing them and making the future generations 
suffer), assuming that the decision to use atomic bombs (or any 
bombs) was seen as immoral after all. However, the argument may 
not be as simple as that. 
Atomic bombs or ordinary air raids: Can Taurek’s argument be 
used to justify ‘killing’?  
As for the medication in the David example, since the atomic 
bombs were owned by the US, the American leaders might have had 
a degree of justification and permission to use them under special 
obligation. The question here is, were the American leaders permitted 
to kill the Japanese citizens actively to save the American soldiers? In 
the David example, strangers were not actively killed, but more or less 
passively killed by not receiving the medication. Importantly, the right 
of the strangers to life is not taken away, but simply not given, even 
though the strangers were not going to survive without your 
medication.  
Historically, many Japanese civilians were killed from regular 
ordinary air raids after the fall of Saipan in July 1944. The 
geographical distance between Saipan and Japan made the US able to 
bomb Japanese cities without an aircraft carrier. American bombers 
flew daily over Japan’s main islands, resulting in the massacre of 
Japanese civilians. Although there are many calculations to identify 
the number of deaths, according to Nihon Keizai Shimbun, (a leading 
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Japanese newspaper which leans neither left nor right), 330,000 
Japanese civilians died in ordinary air raids.57 As sixty four out of sixty 
six of Japan’s largest cities had already been thoroughly burned out, 
bombers had begun to destroy Japan’s smaller cities and towns.58 The 
Japanese casualties were already high and likely to be higher.  
The destruction caused by the two atomic bombs far outweighed 
any destruction that may have resulted from ordinary air raids (given 
the atomic bombs’ huge impact and the effect of radioactivity on 
future generations and the environment). In the David example, by 
saving David rather than five strangers, Taurek says the right of 
strangers are not breached: ‘I violate no one’s rights when I use my 
drug to save David’s life.’59 Whereas in the historical incident, the 
right of the Japanese civilians might have been breached as they were 
actively killed. The difference between the David example and this 
historical incident is the breach of someone else’s moral right.  
Importantly, in the case of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the difference 
between dropping atomic bombs, and conventional bombing may not 
be so great, given the fact that so many Japanese civilians were killed 
by ordinary air raids. The Pacific War was a total war, in which all 
Japanese males aged between fifteen and sixty, and all females aged 
between seventeen and forty were obligated to form a fighting corps 
within their neighbourhood.60 If Japan did not surrender until the fall 
of Tokyo61 (just as Germany fought until the fall of Berlin), the war 
was likely to continue until sometime in 1946 (since the invasion of 
the Kanto/Tokyo plain was planned around 1 March 1946).62 The 
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casualties of Japanese civilians would not only have been as a result of 
ordinary air raids, but from resisting American soldiers during an 
invasion. In the battle of Okinawa (the islands that are located 
between the Japanese main islands and Taiwan) that took place 
between March and June 1945, Japanese soldiers and even civilians, 
including women and children, fought almost to the last individual.63 
It was likely that on the main islands, they would have followed the 
same trend. Huge numbers of Japanese civilians could have been 
killed anyway without the atomic bombs.  
There are, however, some important differences between the two 
types of bombings. If atomic bombing is seen as active killing, the 
ordinary air raids can be seen as passive killing as they were already 
regular occurring events and the normal state of affairs at that time. It 
might be considered that this passive killing is regarded as similar to 
not giving the medication in the David example. Perhaps, the use of 
an atomic bomb is said to be ‘vastly destructive’64 since it destroys the 
whole city and its future. It is impossible for an atomic bomb to be 
used to aim a specific military target, such as factories and naval 
dockyards, since the bomb is designed to destroy a large area. On the 
other hand, ordinary bombing was designed to ‘break civilians 
morale.’65 If you aim to attack military targets only, the number of 
civilian death could be minimal. The difference between atomic 
bombing and ordinary air raids does exist.  
Whichever option the American leader took, it was in fact 
proactive killing. The US government even admitted a year after the 
war that ordinary air raids were so destructive: ‘even without the 
atomic bombing attacks, air supremacy over Japan could have exerted 
sufficient pressure to bring about unconditional surrender and obviate 
the need for invasion’66 For example, in the early morning hours of 10 
March 1945, mass air raids killed more than 100,000 ordinary civilians 
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of Tokyo. Unlike the strangers who were not given the medication in 
the David example, the rights of Japanese civilians were not simply 
taken away.  
The use of the atomic bombs was a political decision and not a 
personal decision of the American leaders, even if their emotions 
might have been involved in making the decision to drop them. 
Perhaps, considering post war international politics, the American 
leaders only had two realistic options, atomic bombing or continuing 
ordinary bombing followed by invasion. If there were only two 
choices, this is where Taurek’s final solution might be used, and that 
is to flip a coin. 
Taurek’s solution: Flipping a coin 
The moral answer might be found in Taurek’s final solution in 
which Taurek says you could flip a coin to decide, because then 
everyone will be given a fifty per cent chance of survival.67 In the 
David example, both David and the strangers are given a fifty per 
cent survival rate. The scale of atomic bombing is a lot larger than the 
David example, but Taurek ‘cannot see how or why the mere addition 
of numbers should change anything.’68  
Some might say that flipping a coin is not a serious way of making 
a moral decision. However, in situations where there are no morally 
distinguishing features to decide one way or the other, then flipping a 
coin is as good as any other process. Taurek says ‘where such an 
option is open to me it would seem to best express my equal concern 
and respect for each person. Who among them could complain that I 
have done wrong?’69 This point is probably the fairest conclusion 
where special obligation does not apply.70 In this case, everyone is 
given an equal chance of survival, without the influence of personal 
and subjective opinions.  
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In the Hiroshima and Nagasaki atomic bombings, since the 
American leaders had their special obligation, it is not morally 
justified for the American leaders to flip a coin to make a decision. 
However, what if a third party flipped a coin? It sounds morally 
justified since the third party does not have a moral obligation 
towards the Americans or the Japanese – in light of Taurek’s 
argument, flipping a coin seems as fair an approach to make such a 
difficult moral decision as any other. However, there are three 
objections that explain why it cannot be used to morally justify the 
atomic bombing.  
Firstly, in the final stage of the war, Japan and the US were not on 
a level playing field. As previously mentioned, many Japanese civilians 
had a great chance of being killed by ordinary air raids. There was no 
equal chance. By flipping a coin, the chance of survival was likely to 
be fifty per cent for the American soldiers – or at least, the chance of 
involving deadly invasion was fifty percent. If they were fortunate 
after the coin toss, the deadly operations could have been avoided. 
On the other hand, the Japanese civilians faced either ordinary air 
raids, followed by possible invasion, or the atomic bombs, and both 
of these were what they wanted to avoid. It was not fair as the 
Japanese, by the flipping of a coin, did not have a fifty per cent 
chance of avoiding the deadly experience.  
Secondly, flipping a coin is only applicable if there is no other 
moral weighting. In the David example, there is one way of surviving 
that is to receive medication. In the historical incident, the atomic 
bomb decision was not an either-or-situation. Atomic bombing 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki was not the only alternative to ending the 
war. There were other alternatives. The best way to have avoided 
invasion and the loss of American (and Japanese) lives was probably 
to propose a conditional surrender to Japan – which the American 
leaders did not offer, due to political reasons. Alternatively, Japan may 
have accepted unconditional surrender, without the destruction of 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki once the USSR entered the war.  
Finally, in the Coast Guard example, it is immoral for the Captain 
to flip a coin to justify his moral decision as he is involved in the 
FJHP – Volume 29 – 2013 
39 
moral activity.71 Applying this to the atomic bombing, flipping a coin 
should be avoided by the American leaders or anyone who was 
involved in the war. So who should flip the coin? During the WWII, 
all major countries (whether they chose to be or not), except perhaps 
Switzerland, were involved in the war. Switzerland was known as a 
permanent neutral state – unlike other neutral countries such as 
Belgium and Luxembourg which were invaded by the Axis 
(particularly Germany), Switzerland stayed away as much as it could 
have from the war. So should the Swiss President have been 
appointed to flip a coin? This could have been the moral way to 
decide whether to drop the atomic bombs. The answer is no, because 
using atomic weapons were not the only available option to end the 
war as this paper has continuously mentioned.  
Conclusion 
This paper has considered whether Taurek’s view can be used to 
justify the use of atomic bombs. Taurek argues you are allowed to 
save ones who are inclusive of your ‘moral force’, regardless of the 
numbers of people involved, and especially given that numbers do 
not count You could therefore develop an argument that:  
1) You are allowed to save the ones to whom you have moral 
obligations. 
2) American political leaders were permitted to make a decision to 
save their soldiers, rather than the Japanese.  
3) Taurek says numbers do not count, since individual suffering is 
not additive. Thus, the fact that the death casualty of Japanese 
civilians was larger than the expected American soldiers’ death does 
not matter. 
However, this does not mean that the use of the two atomic 
bombs is justified. Using this rationale, the use of an atomic bomb on 
Hiroshima might be justified from the point of view that numbers do 
not count when you are permitted to save ones who have priority. 
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However, the use of the second bomb on Nagasaki cannot be 
justified using this argument.  
In fact, Taurek’s view is not sufficient to be used for either 
situation at the end of the war for the following reasons:  
4) The atomic bomb decision was not between killing or letting die 
as seen in Taurek’s example. To use atomic bombs or to attack Japan 
by ordinary air raids (followed by possible invasion) were both 
interfering activities.  
5) The atomic bomb decision was not set on an even-playing field. 
Japanese civilians do not avoid suffering from either outcome – 
killing by atomic bombs or killing by ordinary air raids. Taurek’s 
argument cannot be used to justify this, as neither outcome is 
favourable to the Japanese civilians, and one is worth more than the 
other.  
6) Historical facts are too complicated and Taurek’s view is too 
simplistic and more adaptable for an either/or situation – for 
example, atomic bombing was not the only way to end the war.  
 
Although there are elements of Taurek’s argument which are 
worthy of consideration, this paper concludes that on balance, 
Taurek’s theory cannot be used to justify the use of atomic bombs on 
Hiroshima or Nagasaki.  
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